

INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING OF DIRECTOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL  
FOREIGN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION, AND CONSULTANTS  
TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1950, in office of Director

Present: Department of State - Mr. Barrett, Director  
Mr. Stone, Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense and JSC - Admiral Stevens  
National Security Resources Board - Mr. Sheppard  
Central Intelligence Agency - [redacted]

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Mr. Barrett opened the meeting by referring to the memorandum of May 19, 1950, from Mr. Sheppard relative to the "Draft Report to the National Security Council on a Plan for Psychological Warfare." Noting that the memorandum raised certain fundamental questions regarding the organization for the subsequent stages of war, Mr. Barrett invited Mr. Sheppard to develop his views.

Mr. Sheppard said that he seriously questioned the wisdom of forwarding to NSC conclusions and recommendations at this time which would predetermine the organization for psychological warfare policy and operations in the subsequent stages of war. He outlined two primary reasons why it would not be advisable to attempt to predetermine now the arrangements for the later stages of war.

First, with reference to the top organizational structure for policy direction and coordination, Mr. Sheppard stated that over-all mobilization planning has not reached the point where the President should be asked to commit himself to the form of organization which might be required for the "long pull." He felt that the emergency and interim organization arrangements for the initial stages of war were adequate for the present, and that it is unrealistic to attempt to develop an organization to meet conditions which could not now be foreseen.

Second, with reference to the allocation of responsibilities for the execution of psychological warfare, Mr. Sheppard expressed the view that it was not wise or realistic to freeze such responsibilities beyond the initial stages of war. He recognized the need for planning by the Defense Department for military theaters and was prepared to agree that the principle of theater responsibility should be established. However, he could not say at the present time whether the State Department should be assigned permanent responsibility for the execution of psychological warfare in all areas other than theaters of military operations.

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For these reasons, Mr. Sheppard suggested that those sections relating to the subsequent stages of war be deleted from the body of the report and the conclusions, and that the recommendation request that NSC merely note Enclosure E.

Admiral Stevens, commenting on Mr. Sheppard's statement, said that on the contrary he felt it is not only realistic but essential to provide for the worst situation which might confront us, tomorrow, or at any time. The Plan submitted by the Staff had not been hastily prepared, but had been carefully considered by the departments concerned and had taken into account the points raised by Mr. Sheppard, and various alternative forms of organization. It was important, he said, to look beyond the initial stages of war and attempt to project a continuing organization for the subsequent stages. He added that the provisions for the initial stages could not stand entirely alone but were closely related to the assumptions for subsequent stages. No recommendations made now could bind the President, or a future President, under changed conditions in the future. Admiral Stevens indicated that General Magruder, who was unable to be present, agreed with his views on this matter.

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[ ] concurred in the views expressed by Admiral Stevens and added that any plan of this kind could be changed at any time as conditions may require or as the President may desire. He felt that it was essential to develop our plan as fully as possible on the basis of our best knowledge and judgment, and to lay down basic principles for the long pull as best we can.

Mr. Barrett suggested that there might be very little difference of opinion if agreement could be reached on what parts of the Plan should be forwarded to NSC for approval, and what parts might be merely noted. He recalled that the last meeting had approved sending parts of the report to be noted by NSC and other parts for approval. The Executive Secretary stated that the minutes of the last meeting showed that this question had been raised, but not acted upon, and that Mr. Oechsner had been instructed to check with Mr. James Lay of NSC. Mr. Oechsner had reported that this procedure was acceptable to NSC. Mr. Barrett then suggested a possible formula for the subsequent stages of war along the following lines:

The conclusions should state that for the subsequent stages of war a more permanent form of organization should be established. In establishing this more permanent form of organization, consideration should be given to the proposal prepared by the Staff in Enclosure E.

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Mr. Sheppard suggested that all parts of the body of the report relating to subsequent stages of war, except the principles of military responsibility in theaters of military operations, should be moved to Enclosure E, with notation that the organizational arrangements in Enclosure E had been approved by the Departments of State and Defense.

Admiral Stevens said that he would want more time to study the effect of Mr. Sheppard's proposal, but that he thought Mr. Barrett's suggestion would be practical.

After reviewing the wording of those sections of the report dealing with subsequent stages of war, it was agreed that paragraphs 20 and 22 of the draft report should be revised in line with Mr. Barrett's proposal, so as to include in the conclusions provisions for a permanent form of organization for the subsequent stages.

It was further agreed that the recommendation in paragraph 23 would be revised to state that "the above conclusions, together with Enclosure D be approved; and that Enclosures A, B, C, and E be noted."

The Executive Secretary was instructed to revise the draft report to conform with the recommendations of the Consultants, and to incorporate certain additional changes which had been suggested previously. Specifically, he was instructed to incorporate into the body of the report a provision regarding the covert functions of CIA "as the agency designated to execute covert psychological warfare," to bring the report in line with paragraph 4 of Enclosures D and E. He was also directed to include an additional sub-paragraph under paragraph 19 as follows:

"Provide coordinated intelligence in accordance with requirements established by the Interim Psychological Warfare Board, utilizing to the maximum extent practicable the facilities and capabilities of the other IAC agencies."

It was agreed that the entire report, including all enclosures, should be classified Top Secret.

Mr. Barrett asked that the revised report be circulated promptly for concurrence, or further discussion if required.

IFIS:WTStone:vth  
6/14/50

MEETINGS

Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000500120012-7

- A. June 13, 1950
- B. June 28, 1950 (two copies of this meeting)
- C. July 14, 1950
- D. July 31, 1950
- E. August 7, 1950
- F. August 14, 1950
- G. August 15, 1950
- H. August 21, 1950
- I. August 28, 1950
- J. September 5, 1950
- K. September 11, 1950
- L. September 13, 1950
- M. September 18, 1950
- N. September 25, 1950
- O. October 2, 1950
- P. October 9, 1950
- Q. October 12, 1950
- R. October 12, 1950 - *two copies*
- S. October 16, 1950
- T. October 30, 1950

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